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ABSTRACT
Andreas Jozwiak: Patterns of Anti-Immigrant Protests in Germany
(Under the direction of Dr. Rahsaan Maxwell)
This thesis examines the wave of anti immigrant protests in Germany during 2014-15. I
examine underlying social, economic and political conditions across the 400 counties that
jointly determine the number of protests that occurred. I find that unemployment, a lack of
contact with foreigners and strength of the local right wing party are related to higher levels
of protests. Counter intuitively, I find that higher levels of education, especially in the East,
are related to more protests.
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Patterns of Anti-Immigrant Protest in Germany, 2014-15
The emergence of protests in liberal democracies implies citizens’ deep dissatisfaction with
a government’s actions or statements. These citizens feel as though the government is not
responding to their concerns and they have no institutionalized means by which to address
their concerns. Understanding why citizens protest is critical to our understanding of politics,
because what happens on the streets affects what happens in the halls of power. In this paper,
I examine the underlying structural conditions in politics, economics, and society that jointly
determine protests across the more than 400 German counties in 2015. These protests were
a response to the both the overwhelming numbers of Syrian and Middle Eastern migrants
arriving in Germany and the government’s policy welcoming all refugees to the country.
Germany is an important case because it is the largest European economy and democracy
and a leader within the European Union. It was among the first countries to announce
it would accept many hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the public’s reaction reflects
broader anti-immigrant sentiment around the continent as well as the renewed popularity of
right wing populist parties.
The recent wave of migrants and refugees making the long and often dangerous
journey from Syria (and Afghanistan) to Europe has brought renewed interest to the ways
in which governments and citizens are responding to the crisis. While migration to the
advanced, industrialized nations of Western Europe is not by any means a new phenomenon,
it comes at a time of strained relations among EU nations, largely a result of the economic
downturn that began in 2008. What is unique about this wave of migration is its scale;
Germany received nearly one million refugees in 2015, many times that other nations are
accepting. The most visible outcome has been large and frequent protests. In a protest in
the East German city of Dresden, one protest saw over 20,000 people participating (SZ, 12
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Jan 2015). The intensity of these protests is unprecedented in Germany, where earlier waves
of anti-immigrant protests were able to attract at most a few thousand protestors.
This paper examines the mobilization of protests at the county (Kreis) level in
Germany. In particular, I will focus on how county-level variation in economic and so-
cial indicators and right-wing party strength affects the predicted probability and count of
protests. I find support for my hypothesis that protests are more likely to occur in places
experiencing economic distress. Those facing economic pressures, whether they be long term
(due to deindustrialization and globalization) or short term (unemployment) are more likely
to protest against refugees. They perhaps fear economic competition with refugees. Percep-
tions of economic threat are intimately related to cultural threat; places with little experience
with foreigners are more likely to feel threatened by the resettlement of culturally dissimilar
refugees in their communities. Paradoxically, after controlling for income and population,
higher levels of education at the county level were associated with more protests. This is
due to higher than average levels of education in former Communist East Germany, and
suggests education, commonly associated with cosmopolitan values, may not have the same
effect there. Finally, the election of right-wing parties (such as the AfD and NPD) at the
community level institutionalizes them within the political process. This, I suggest grants
them both legitimacy and organizational capacities that have been used to facilitate protests.
Of course, social movements are cyclical; the 2014/2015 protest wave is not the first
expression of anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany. This wave follows several periods of anti-
immigrant violence in the 90s. Groups like the NPD and Republikaner used similar rhetoric
of cultural loss and national sovereignty, though different tactics, as those demonstrating
today (Kurthen 1995, Koopmans 1993). However, both the scale of the functional pressure
(resettling refugees) and protests (in the hundreds, with tens of thousands of participants)
set it apart from previous waves and calls for new theorization of the process of mobilization.
In the following sections, I first lay out the reasons at a structural level for citizens
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to oppose or feel threatened by large numbers of migrants. I suggest that this has to do
with economic decline (as opposed to threat), and the relative inexperience of many German
communities with foreign born populations. In addition, there may be particularities of the
East German case that contravene the literature’s findings on the effects of education. Next,
I examine the impact of organizational presence and strength on protests. Following that, I
present my empirical findings and conclude by suggesting further avenues for this research.
This paper brings together literatures on social movements to help explain the pro-
cess and dynamic of mobilization. But because citizens are mobilizing around the issue of
immigration, the scholarship on attitudes towards immigrants can shed light on the con-
ditions that lead people to express negative attitudes. While negative attitudes are not a
sufficient reason for protesting, they can be employed by social movement actors to mobilize
a population. The Political Science literature on attitudes towards immigrants suggests a
number of factors that lead to anti-immigrant sentiment, including ideology, education/skill
level, perceived threat to the welfare state, nation, and labor market prospects (Karapin
1999, Borjas 1987, Scheve 2001, Helbing and Kriesi 2014, Hainmueller and Hopinks 2014).
Hanimueller and Hopkins (2014) suggest economic self-interest plays a relatively small or
indeterminate role on attitudes, but the scale of the functional pressures Germany is facing
potentially challenge the mixed findings in the literature. Of course, economic and cultural
reasons for opposing immigration are related, and I use several indicators of each type.
Daphi et al. (2015) conducted extensive research during PEGIDA protests in Ger-
many in 2014/2015, including protest observations and online interviews with participants.
They collected information about the background and motives of protestors, which differ from
several other protest movements in Germany and common perceptions of protests against
migrants. These studies were conducted on the protestors in Dresden, Saxony, where the
largest and most visible protests took place. While limiting the generalizability of their
findings, it is nonetheless an important window into the types of people and places where
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mobilization takes place.
Several of Daphi et al’s findings contradict previous empirical findings about the
causes of mobilization and participation in previous right-wing activities in Germany. First,
Koopmans (1996) finds that cases of violence against foreigners in Germany are mainly
perpetrated by younger males who are socially and economically marginalized and members
of neo-Nazi groups. By contrast, the protestors in Dresden were older (25-64) and had
above average levels of education. Second, the scale of the protests is unprecedented; there
were more than 200 in 2015 alone, and participation in some cases brought more than
25,000 citizens on the streets. This recent wave of protest clearly represents a departure
from understandings of who participates, and thus this requires a context-specific theoretical
framework that captures the diverse types of people who are protesting
While Geiges et al (2015) suggest recent protests are not a part of a process of
social relegation leading to xenophobia, I argue this is, in fact, the case. The majority of the
protestors interviewed at the Dresden protests were between 24 and 64, a generation who
have largely lost out from the economic transformation of East Germany over the last 25
years. Reunification meant great structural changes to the East German economy; industries
and manufacturing left the East and with their departure a large number of highly-skilled
employees out of the work they had been trained to do. The loss of industrial jobs meant
a loss of income and in the continental European cases (especially West Germany) the loss
of generous employment protection schemes (Thelen 2013). The case of deindustrialization
is most acutely felt in East Germany precisely because reunification brought about large
economic as well as political/cultural shifts. But these economic processes are also occurring
in West Germany. The effects are still being felt today and may even have been exacerbated
by the 2008 economic crisis.
Considerable literature on individuals’ attitudes towards migrants have focused on
education. Many tests of economic threat use education as a proxy for skill, which is a crude
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measure. This thesis suggests that those who feel most economically threatened by migrants
(the unemployed, low-wage service sector employees, young people) will be the most likely to
report negative attitudes (Park 1950, Scheve and Slaughter 2001). But education works in
both an economic and cultural sense; more educated people more likely have cosmopolitan
identities and understandings that reduce anti-immigrant sentiment (Hainmueller and Hiscox
2007, 2010). This is especially true in higher education, where understanding comes alongside
larger and more diverse social networks (Betts 1988, Chandler and Tsai 2001).
This stands contrary to the finding that PEGIDA protestors had above average
levels of education as compared to Germany as a whole (Daphi et al 2015). This may be
a particularity of the East German case; the type of education received by former East
Germans may have been of a different quality that did not promote cultural values like
cosmopolitanism. Research on the effect of education specifically looks at Western education
systems, and has perhaps not considered how different education under Communism was
(Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002). Schooling in East Germany may have been more
vocational and less rooted in a broader, liberal arts tradition. Education may still bring
about increased social tolerance, but in this case the effect might be ’washed out’ by economic
insecurity coupled with the cultural insecurity of reunification.
The literature on ’modernization losers’ thus has mixed findings; deindustrialization
has been shown in some instances (both cross-nationally and subnationally) to be related
to the election of right wing parties (Swank and Betz 2003, Kriesi et al 2006, for example),
but this literature also highlights the importance of cultural factors (Oesch 2008, Sides and
Citrin 2007). These causal arguments are about the election of right wing parties, these
parties are the organizational basis for many protests. Furthermore, Braun and Koopmans
(2010) suggest that more socio-economically similar places will experience similar protest
activities, and so I expect that deindustrialization combined with the election of these parties
will lead to more protests at the county level. My argument is not one of direct economic
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competition, though, and it is very likely that the feeling of general insecurity about one’s
personal situation has both economic and cultural components.
However, the data on deindustrialization are limited. Time series data for dif-
ferent indicators begin in 1995 and 2001, meaning that changes reflect not the process of
deindustrialization, but the economic recovery that began to take place in East Germany
after reunification. Whether long or short term, I still expect economic downturn to affect
the probability of protest, because citizens feel a similar threat from potential for economic
competition. Therefore, I use a measure of the current level of unemployment to measure
the economic determinants of protests. Current unemployment reflects both the changes
wrought by deindustrialization, because individuals may not have been able to transition to
new jobs. In addition, looking at current unemployment reflects the pressures induced by
the 2008 financial crisis.
The literature on attitudes towards immigration and right-wing parties stresses the
importance of cultural fears and threats (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, Oesch 2008, Sides
and Citrin 2007). Indeed, interviewed protestors expressed fears over the loss of German
national identity and culture, poorer prospects for future generations, and terrorism. This
suggests that motivations for protesting lie both in identities as well as (indirectly) through
economic insecurities. These fears are not necessarily based in reason; the inherent contra-
diction, though, is most correctly estimated the (very low) percentage of the local population
who were of foreign decent. Intergroup contact theory suggests this is not so surprising; those
who interact with immigrants or Auslaender more generally are less likely to feel threatened
(Pettigrew 1998).
Immigration and the arrival of foreign-born peoples to a country has the potential
to threaten the identities of natives. Examining how identities are conceptualized and how
variations in this conceptualization play out across space becomes the critical challenge.
German national identity has long been premised on an ethno-centric model that was first
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challenged by the immigration of millions of Turkish Gastarbeiter in the 1960s and 70s, whose
permanent settlement and family reunification was an unintended outcomes (Esses et al
2006). Citizenship laws remained highly restricted to those with German lineage until 1990,
when it became easier for Turks to gain citizenship. The approach to their integration was
either segregationist or assimilationist, further deepening the exclusive notion of citizenship
(Kurthen 1995). Tellingly, Germans do not typically use the term ‘immigrant,’ but refer
to immigrants as ‘Auslaender’ or ‘Fremde’ (Foreigners) (Schnapper 2007). Nevertheless,
Germans still do not see their country as one of immigration in the way that France or the
United States does, and did not have an official immigration policy until 2005 (Esses et al
2006, Grassler 2005). Kurthen (1995) sees a fundamental dissonance between the liberal
asylum policy and universal conception of human rights against the vlkisch definition of the
nation.
I expect those with a narrower conception of identity to feel most threatened by
immigrants. Closer identification with the ethnocentric notion of the nation, which can be
particularly salient in Germany, leads individuals to feel more of an out-group threat. Esses
et al. (2006) find empirical evidence that in Germany, the heightening of in-group salience led
Germans to express more negative attitudes towards immigrants, as compared to participants
from Canada, with a more broadly constructed national identity. Conversely, acceptance of a
broader, European identity predicts more inclusiveness and therefore acceptance of outsiders
(Hooghe and Marks 2004, Luedtke 2005, Schildkraut 2005). Variation in the exclusivity may
be a function of politics, or the presence of a group that exists to mobilize and heighten the
salience of group identities (Branscome, Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 1999).
In order for political actors to heighten the salience of particular identities, there
must be a ‘perceived threat,’ which is easier to conceptualize and operationalize than the
strength of identities. The politicization of identities and perceived threats is more likely to
be done in places with little experience with immigration. Intergroup contact theory posits
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that more contact with ethnic minorities in cities generates empathy that tends to reduce
anti-immigrant sentiment (Pettigrew 1998, Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). Thus, the most
pro-migrant protests and counter-demonstrations have occurred in the large, cosmopolitan
cities. On the other hand, places with little experience with immigration will view immi-
grants more frequently as threats, especially in light of the German government’s plan to
distribute refugees across the country based on tax revenues and population. For some small
communities, this potentially could mean the sudden arrival of hundreds of refugees that
change the face of the community, especially in East Germany.
Next, I argue that far right political parties in power in part serve as the orga-
nizational structures that have been used to organize protests. Parties do more than put
candidates up for election; they require a level of organization at a local level to organize
campaigns and communicate with voters. These interactions with citizens can be (and have
been) retooled to mobilize protestors.
In social movement studies, cultural and economic threats are ‘grievances,’ which
in and of themselves are not sufficient for mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1976). Instead,
they must be translated into actions where the political system is open to protests and
organizations exist to mobilize citizens (Kurzman 1996). Political opportunity structures are
the structural conditions in politics, economics, and society that signal to would be protestors
that the environment is open to extrainstitutional challenges to politics (Tarrow 1994, 2006).
Political opportunities vary at many levels of the polity; certain parts of Germany may
experience more anti-immigrant protests for several structural reasons, such as the decline
of traditional industries and the reunification of Germany.
Recent scholarship has sought to move the political opportunities literature away
from a static conceptualization based on structural conditions and the balance of power
between states and social movements (McAdam et al 2003). This strand focuses on the
relational dynamics among actors, culture and public opinion; the logic being that opportu-
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nities are greater where society can identify with the protestors and vice versa (Braun and
Koopmans 2013, Klandermans 2014). National political elites have mostly favored Chancel-
lor Merkel’s decision to open the door to hundreds of thousands of Syrians, notwithstanding
dissent from within her own party. State and local elites, however, may have differing opin-
ions, as they are the ones responsible for resettling and accommodating refugees. At the
subnational level there is also much greater heterogeneity of political parties and groups rep-
resented, especially right wing groups. Political parties are ‘insiders’ to the political system;
they are professionalized organizations with routine access to policy-making bodies.
Some of the literature suggests that professionalization of movement organizations
leads them to engage in more regular forms of political action (Staggenborg 1988). On the
other hand, Andrews (2001) argues that the most successful organizations and movements
are those that can engage in both insider and outsider tactics. This is precisely the type
of mixed strategies these groups are pursuing. The presence of strong right-wing parties
indicates an organizational presence in a locale and one that is capable of organizing activists,
disseminating information, and attempting to influence policy. The NPD, AfD and PEGIDA
represent far-right sentiment in their regions, and they always form an opposition to the
mainstream parties. Neither of the parties has ever been in a ruling coalition and had to
deal with the reality of governing. As a result, they function more as challengers to the
system and have focused their energies on grassroots mobilization that highlights their cause
and makes them more visible than their small electoral success would suggest (Tilly 1978).
This is perhaps the main benefit of having seats in government; it gives them a
legitimacy they would otherwise lack as social movement organizations. It also guarantees
them access to the press and public funding as political parties. Furthermore, it institution-
alizes the movement within governing structures, thereby granting them a level of security
(until the next election) that helps sustain the movement over the long run (Andrews 1997,
Rupp and Taylor 1990). On the other hand, being a part of the opposition serves a purpose
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in making the right-wing’s voice heard, but does not translate into policy victories. While
they have explicit policy goals, they may realize that their true power lies in their ability to
influence government, elites, and the public via framing and organization (Maguire 1995).
Furthermore, they can use their status inside government to create political opportunities
for themselves. Koopmans (1996, 1999) find an empirical association between the strength
of right-wing parties and violent actions against minority groups (see also Arzheimer and
Carter 2006). I expect the same to be true for protests.
There are several organizations behind the recent wave of protests. First, many
smaller protests were organized by the NPD, which is the reconstructed Nazi party. Out
of all groups, it has the most radical ideology, and garners a modest share of the vote in
many county governments. The NPD protests seem to be of a different stripe than the
AfD/PEGIDA protests. They are smaller, occur with regularity in the same place, and are
more confrontational. For example, the party organized several weekly protests in Berlin-
Marzhan directly in front of an asylum shelter. The NPD protests are relatively uninteresting
because they are smaller, mobilize from a base that is fairly consistent, and thus they are
just ‘riding the wave’ of this protest cycle.
Two other groups, the AfD (Alternative fr Deutschland) party and social movement
organization PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident) have
held protests that have brought more than 25,000 people to the streets, a scale unmatched by
any other anti-immigrant protest in Germany. The scale of protests attests not only to the
functional pressures presented by the arrival of refugees, but also the much broader appeal
and base these groups are able to attract. When asked to place themselves on a left-right
scale, 33% of PEGIDA protestors placed themselves as ‘right,’ more than twice that of the
German population as a whole. Almost half placed themselves in the ‘middle.’ This suggests
these movements are capturing individuals who belong to the traditional constituencies of
the CDU or SPD but who have been drawn to the AfD. This is a result of party competition
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and the recent rise (and re-posititioning) of the AfD on the German political scene.
The AfD is a right-wing populist party. It began as a euro-skeptic party with
a largely neoliberal ideology that grew out of popular dissatisfaction with Germany’s role
in the Southern Eurozone economies after the financial crisis. However, internal fractures
within the party came to a breaking point in late 2014/early 2015, and the more right-wing
faction of the party, led by Frauke Petry, took over. Since then, the party has moved to take
advantage of refugee crisis and made it a central part of their platform, and has organized
many large demonstrations on the issue. The group is on the rise and is posturing itself to
become Germany’s first true populist right party, much like the Sweden Democrats or Front
National in France. It has done remarkably well in regional elections, capturing up to 15
percent of the vote in the most recent regional elections in 2016. They have done this by
poaching voters from the mainstream parties, who have employed ‘blurring strategies’ on
the refugee issue (Elias et al 2015).
The rise of the AfD comports nicely with Tarrow’s description of the cyclicality
of protest movements. Social movements become a spark that feeds itself and, “set[s] a
precedent that enables others to enter the social movement sector, expand the scope of
contestation, and thus improve the opportunity structure for protest and eventually peaks
when resources spent and coopted by political institutions (Kitschelt 1993:18)” The AfD was
taken over by Petry at a time where it allowed the party to greatly expand its popularity and
relevance in German politics. Furthermore, they were elected into office in 2014, before the
beginning of the refugee crisis. Their subsequent platform shift has meant they are able to
take advantage of their institutional status, but their populism has allowed them to continue
utilize grassroots mobilization.
The AfD and PEGIDA have a complicated relationship (Thran and Boehnke 2015).
PEGIDA has attempted to work with the AfD to organize protests against immigrants. But
the AfD has resisted association with the group because of racist comments and symbols used
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by its protestors, and explicitly prohibits these at its own protests. While there may be little
formal coordination, there is probably large crossover in terms of participants. When Daphi
et al. (2015) interviewed protestors at PEGIDA rallies, nearly all of them reported they
would vote for the AfD if the next election were tomorrow. Therefore, I expect the electoral
strength of the AfD and NPD to relate to the organizational capacity right wing organizations
possess at a local level. This institutionalization in politics gives them legitimacy, but also
the resources and networks necessary for the organization of protests.
My theory comes in three stages. First, grievances flow from the processes of
deindustrialization that lead to economic and social displacement. In addition, places with
low levels of immigration are more likely to be threatened by the potential arrival of refugees
to their communities. These two concepts are related, But because protests do not simple
arise from fears of cultural or economic threat, I examine the mobilizing structures at the
county level. In this case, I proxy for the organizational capacity of groups to mobilize
citizens by looking at the strength of right wing parties in the most recent regional elections.
This leads me to three hypotheses about the relationship between organizations,
identity threats, and protests at the county level: H1: Counties that have experienced eco-
nomic decline will be more likely to experience protests. H2: Counties with little experience
with immigration will experience higher numbers of protests. H3: The higher the share of
votes right wing parties receive at the county level, the better they will be able to organize
protests.
My dependent variable will be a count of anti-immigrant protests that occurred in
2015 in each county in Germany. I will analyze the data at the Kreis (or county) level, the
smallest until of political geography for which economic and population data are available.
Fortunately, a German NGO, Mut Gegen Rechte Gewalt (Courage Against Right-Wing
Violence), has collected data on violent and non-violent protest activities against migrants in
Germany since 2014. These data are collected from a variety of sources, such as newspapers,
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local organizations, and also from the social media pages of organizations like PEGIDA,
NPD and AfD. Their data collection is the result of the combing of newspaper reports,
pro-immigrant civil society reports of protests, and monitoring of Facebook pages of anti-
immigrant groups in each region. While their data collection provides more extensive account
of protests than might otherwise be reported by national media outlets, there are some issues
with missing data. For all of 2014, there are some areas for which the number of protests is
zero, which is highly implausible in some cases. Furthermore, there are some well known ‘hot-
spots’ of highly publicized protests in some of the East German states which might lead to
over reporting of protest events and underreporting of activity in states with fewer protests.
Nevertheless, it is the most complete dataset of anti-immigrant protests in Germany, and
my dataset includes nearly 300 observations of protests for 2015.
A central element of my theory revolves around the electoral strength, which I
conceptualize as the organizational capacity of right wing groups at the county level. I will
use a measure representing the percentage of the vote received by any one of the far-right
parties on the German political scene in each state and county (NPD or AfD). However,
Koopmans (1996) suggests that even mainstream right wing parties have the same effect of
supporting protests. Thus, I will calculate for each Kreis the total vote percentage received
by all right-of-center parties in the last regional elections. I calculate election results for
the most recent county-level elections. While in a few cases the most recent election was in
2011, the vast majority of elections occurred in March-May of 2014. The AfD was voted
into office on a platform that at the time was not explicitly anti-immigrant. At the time, it
was focused on Germanys role in the Eurozone crisis. This is critical to my study, because it
speaks to the way in which the partys organization was retooled for organize protests after
they were already in power, lessening the concern that the causality flows from protests to
electoral victories for these parties.
Measuring identities is difficult. I test my theory about threat to identities by
13
leveraging fine-grained population data available for each county. These data report the
number and percentage of Auslnder in each county (and state). Finally, I also predict
that areas with planned asylum homes will experience protests directed against the planned
resettlement of refugees. These data are not currently available, but they are a good measure
of a direct (as opposed to latent) threat to identities that I will include in future versions of
this paper.
I theorize that the structural changes to the economy have an effect on the ways
in which natives perceive immigrants. In line with this, I test my hypothesis with unem-
ployment data. Ideally, the variable would be a change measured over a long time span, but
data in this time series begins in 2001, and thus captures economic recovery rather, espe-
cially in the East, rather than decline that resulted from the fall of Communism. Instead, I
use unemployment data from 2013. This is imperfect, but it could also capture some of the
lingering effects of the economic crisis of 2008 that affected European economies.
I also test several interactions between my independent variables, because it is
highly likely that the effect of some is conditional on another. I will test the interaction
of the presence of foreign-born peoples in a county and the electoral strength of right wing
parties. The presence of grievances, or the threats to culture and identities, in this case, are
not enough to spark protest. Grievances are omnipresent and do not always result in social
movement activity. Therefore, looking at the organizational structures that mobilize indi-
viduals, in conjunction with the level of grievances, should provide insight into the patterns
of protest activity. Gaikwad and Nellis (2016), for example, find an interactive (rather than
linear additive) effect between the presence of ethnic minorities and labor market competi-
tion in predicting attitudes towards immigrants. I have a similar expectation with regard to
the interaction between the percent of foreigners and unemployment levels.
In addition, I will employ a number of control variables. A well-grounded finding in
the social movement literature is that protests tend to occur in areas with higher populations
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and particularly in cities. I include a measure of the logged population of the county. In
addition, I include a measure of GDP per capita as a measure of economic performance.
These data come from the German Statistical Agency. Finally, I include a dummy for areas
of the former East Germany, as these areas have disproportionately had more protests and
right-wing activity.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Minimum Median Mean Maximum NAs
Number of Protests 0 0 0.66 34
Percent Vote Share Far Right 0.00 0.00 2.20 16.30
Chng in Manufacturing Emp. -3.04 -0.07 -0.13 0.84 12
Population 34200.00 146800.00 198800.00 3292000.00 1
Percent Auslaender 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.29 1
Log of GDP per capita 2.66 3.36 3.42 4.98 2
Unemployment -11.98 -0.20 -1.25 4.90 3
(a) Histogram of DV (b) Dispersion of DV
Figure 1: Dependent Variable
Figure 1, panel a shows the distribution of my dependent variable, the number
of protests in each county over the course of this ’wave’ of protests that began in 2014 and
through the end of 2015. The vast majority of counties where protests did occur had between
zero and five protests. However, about twenty counties experienced more than that, in some
cases up to thirty protests. Panel b shows the check for overdispersion (if the variance is
greater than the mean) of the dependent variable. Overdispersion does not seem to be an
issue, and so this means using a Poisson estimator is appropriate, as opposed to a negative
binomial or quasi-poisson, for example.
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Figures 2 through 6 depict the spatial distribution of my independent variables of
interest alongside my dependent variable, the number of protests that occurred at the county
level over the period 2014-15. The majority of protests occurred in the old East, but there
are a significant number of protests in the industrial areas of the West. Unsurprisingly, the
number of protests was highest in large cities. Figure two depicts the association between
deindustrialization, as measured by the change in unemployment (as a percent of the working
age population) between 2001 and 2014 (2001 is the earliest year in the data). There is a
stark contrast between the former GDR and West German counties. However, the data
(because it first starts in 2001) produce an image of economic change that actually shows
increased unemployment in the West. On the other hand, it demonstrates the beginning of
an economic recovery of the former GDR, with unemployment rates decreasing up to twelve
percent from 2001 to 2014.
Figure 2: Change in Unemployment 2001-2014 and Protests
Figure three shows the current (2014) unemployment levels at the county level. In
the absence of better data for deindustrialization, this demonstrates that the East is still
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struggling economically. The counties in the East have much higher levels of unemployment
as compared to those in the West. However, it also shows that the industrial counties in
the Ruhrgebiet in the West are also experiencing higher levels of unemployment. This figure
shows there is some spatial association between higher unemployment at the county level
and increased protest activity.
Figure 3: Unemployment and Protests
Figure 4 demonstrates the stark difference in concentration of foreign populations
in German counties. The independent variable shown is the percentage of the county’s
population that is not native German. This includes second or third generation Turkish
immigrants who do not hold German passports. The spatial distribution of this variable
is nearly the inverse of the map of unemployment. The lowest levels of immigrants are in
the former GDR, with the exception of Berlin. The West has higher than average levels of
immigrants throughout, but they are particularly concentrated in the cities and industrial
areas. Protests have occurred most frequently in places in the former East with low levels of
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foreign populations, lending some support to the hypothesis that a lack of contact with other
peoples does not promote tolerance. However, places in the West with the most protests are
those with large foreign born populations. It is unclear how the effects of economic decline
and intergroup contact counteract each other in the organization of protests.
Figure 4: Auslaender Population and Protests
Figure 5 depicts the spatial distribution of education across the German counties.
I measure education as the percentage of a county’s population that is considered ‘prepared
for higher education,’ as data on the number of college graduates is unavailable. This is
keeping in line with the idea that higher levels of education promote values like tolerance
and identities that are cosmopolitan rather than insular. Most noticeably, the border between
the former GDR and West Germany is not visible, and there is little spatial patterning to
the data, other than perhaps than that between urban and rural areas. While East Germany
does not have the highest absolute levels of education, they are higher than in many other
counties throughout the country. This calls into question what the effect of education is,
especially considering Daphi et al’s (2015) findings that PEGIDA protestors in Dresden were
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Figure 5: Education Levels and Protests
mostly highly educated individuals.
Figure 6 presents the spatial association between protest numbers and the strength
of far right parties (NPD and AfD votes) at the Kreis level. Clearly, there is a strong
relationship between the vote share received by far right parties and protests. My theory
suggests this is because of the organizational capacity required to organize and carry out
protests, as they rarely spring up from self-organization of citizens. The East/West split
is evident, but features less prominently in this map. This attests to the more widespread
support that the AfD has garnered in recent elections in 2014. The AfD gained many votes
from traditional mainstream party constituencies in the industrial parts of the West, whereas
the NPD only received one or two percent. In the East, the strong right wing representation
comes from support for both the NPD and AfD, totaling up to sixteen percent of the vote.
This map’s data is from the end of 2015, but is likely to change as the AfD gains more votes
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in upcoming regional and local elections.
Figure 6: Far Right Parties’ Vote Share and Protests
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Auslaender Far Right Unemp. Manuf. Chng. Unemp. Chng.
(Intercept) 0.16 −1.61∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −1.40∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.06) (0.11)
Pct. Auslaender −10.84∗∗∗
(1.84)
Pct. Far Right 0.29∗∗∗
(0.01)
Unemp. Pct 0.29∗∗∗
(0.02)
Manuf. Emp. Chng −0.01
(0.15)
Unemp. Chng −0.27∗∗∗
(0.02)
AIC 1363.99 999.42 1158.24 1390.35 1040.62
BIC 1371.98 1007.41 1166.23 1398.28 1048.61
Log Likelihood −680.00 −497.71 −577.12 −693.17 −518.31
Deviance 1155.23 790.65 949.48 1181.58 835.52
Num. obs. 402 403 401 391 400
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Bivariate Model Estimates
I test my models first by ignoring spatial and temporal factors and focus solely on
the relationship between my independent variables of interest and the dependent variable,
the number of protests in a county. This is best modeled with a Poisson estimator; I have
checked for overdispersion and it should not affect the assumptions made in my analysis.
Using a zero-inflated model is preferable; there might be a separate process that determines
whether or not a protest occurs and a separate one that determines the number. However,
none of the zero inflated models I ran were able to converge. Before I run my models with
controls, I estimate bivariate regressions with the variables of interest. As shown in Table 1,
three of the five independent variables of interest is statistically significantly related in the
correct direction to the number of protests at the county level. First, increases in percentage
of the Auslnder population is statistically significantly related to an increased number of
protests. Second, the percentage of the vote share received by far right parties is also related
to an increase in the predicted number of protests. The same holds true for the current level
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of unemployment at the county level.
Table 3: Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Intercept) −14.72∗∗∗ −18.81∗∗∗ −18.80∗∗∗ −18.32∗∗∗ −18.81∗∗∗ −15.57∗∗∗
(1.03) (1.50) (1.52) (1.49) (1.50) (1.68)
Pct Far Right 0.24∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pct Auslaender −10.63∗∗∗ −12.45∗∗∗ −8.44∗∗ −10.40∗∗∗ 7.53∗
(2.79) (3.00) (2.90) (2.68) (3.53)
Chng. Manuf. Emp. −0.34∗ 0.23
(0.15) (0.17)
Pct Unemployed 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Education 3.10∗
(1.38)
East Dummy 1.86∗∗∗
(0.34)
Logged GDP −1.38∗∗∗ −0.46 −0.37 −0.27 −0.22 −1.70∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.42)
Logged Pop 2.83∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.42)
AIC 761.05 747.10 739.83 696.60 701.45 617.31
BIC 777.03 767.07 763.62 724.37 725.42 649.14
Log Likelihood −376.53 −368.55 −363.91 −341.30 −344.73 −300.66
Deviance 548.29 532.34 523.06 477.84 484.69 411.57
Num. obs. 401 401 390 390 401 395
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Two other independent variables that attempted to measure the nature of dein-
dustrialization in Germany were either not statistically significantly related to protests or
signed in the wrong direction. One of my measures for deindustrialization was the change in
employment in manufacturing from 1995 to 2014. As Table 2 shows, this does not visually
(or statistically) seem to be the case. Manufacturing employment actually increased in parts
of East Germany during this period. This is likely due to the cheaper cost of labor in some
areas, and so may actually represent economic recovery in that region. 1995 is the earliest
year for which data on employment is available, and it is possible that examining a period
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(a) Far Right Parties (b) Unemployment
(c) Pct Auslaender
Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities
of time that includes the transition from socialist economies would yield significant results.
The same is true for the change in unemployment; the data here only goes back to 2001.
Again, East Germany experienced the largest decreases in unemployment since 2001, again
demonstrating the gradual recovery of the local economies.
In the next set of models I introduce control variables that include the log of the
population and the log of the GDP at the county level. This accounts for some of the other
factors at the county level that might lead to higher protest levels. I do include dummy
variables for East Germany, as many other studies have done; these dummies are generally
statistically significant and have a large effect size, but they do not reveal much about the
underlying causal processes. Nevertheless, there is something about being in the former
GDR that makes one more likely to protest. My theory suggests this is likely the result
of twin cultural and economic threats that result from the prospect of the arrival of many
refugees in areas that are economically depressed and have little experience with immigrant
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or foreigner populations. These people have less cosmopolitan identities and are thus more
likely to feel threatened by their arrival into the community.
In each model, increases in the percent of the vote share in county elections for
far right parties is consistently statistically significantly related to higher number of protest
instances in a county. The same is true for the percent of Auslaender in the county, except
for one case. Intergroup contact theory as well as considerable research on cosmopolitan
and European identities suggests that experience with other groups increases familiarity
and decreases perceptions of threats out-groups present. In the case where the Auslaender
variable falls out of statistical significance, it is perhaps due to multicollinearity in the data
between the percent of foreigners and economic variables, as immigrants tend to migrate
to places with economic opportunities. Decreases in long term manufacturing employment
are statistically significantly related to decreases in the predicted number of protests at the
county level. The long term measure of change in unemployment is, as in the bivariate
regressions statistically significant but signed in the wrong direction. This is a feature of
the data spanning from 2001 to 2014, when the East began to recover economically. In
model 5 I substitute the long term measures of deindustrialization with the current level of
unemployment in each county. This measure is statistically significantly related to protest
activity (see also Figure 2) in that higher levels of local unemployment are associated with
higher numbers of protests. In each case, the controls are signed in the right direction, even
if they are not statistically significant.
I present the results of my interaction models in Table 3 and Figure 8. These
models were run using a Poisson estimator. While the coefficients are still not directly
interpretable, they nevertheless illustrate relative changes in the effect of a variable when
conditioned on another. The interaction terms were plotted using the ‘interplot’ package in
R, which calculates confidence intervals using a simulation method (and using the default
number of simulations). Subfigure A (from Model 6) demonstrates that the effect of far right
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Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
(Intercept) −19.24∗∗∗ −19.89∗∗∗ −18.26∗∗∗ −14.83∗∗∗ −15.44∗∗∗ −10.39∗∗∗
(1.56) (1.52) (1.49) (1.68) (1.68) (2.08)
Pct Far Right 0.24∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Auslaender −3.99 −11.43∗∗∗ −42.68∗∗∗ −7.81∗∗ 6.84 10.52∗∗
(3.41) (2.63) (7.36) (2.80) (3.61) (3.49)
Unemployment 0.18∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.01 0.21∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12)
Education 4.53 5.48∗ −14.41∗∗
(2.35) (2.23) (4.47)
Far Right*Auslaender −1.73∗∗
(0.61)
Far Right*Unemp −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01)
Auslaender*Unemp 3.07∗∗∗
(0.61)
Far-Right*Educ 0.15
(0.32)
Education*East DE −2.89
(2.18)
Unemp*Education 1.90∗∗∗
(0.46)
East Germany Dummy 2.58∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.35)
Controls X X X X X X
AIC 695.29 666.36 675.96 647.48 617.56 601.03
BIC 723.25 694.32 703.92 679.32 653.37 636.84
Log Likelihood −340.64 −326.18 −330.98 −315.74 −299.78 −291.52
Deviance 476.53 447.60 457.20 441.75 409.82 393.29
Num. obs. 401 401 401 395 395 395
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4: Model Estimates with Interaction Terms
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(a) Far Right * Auslaender (b) Far Right * Unemployment
(c) Unemployment * Auslaender (d) Far Right * Education
(e) East Germany * Education (f) Education * Unemployment
Figure 8: Interaction Terms
parties on protests declines as the percent of the foreign population increases, although the
confidence intervals become rather large. This is because of a lack of instances in which
the Auslaender population is very high. Therefore, it is possible there is little substantive
difference in effects. Subfigure B (from Model 7) demonstrates that the effect of far right
parties on protests declines as one moves from the minimum level of unemployment to the
maximum. More simply, the predictive power of right wing votes decreases as the economic
situation deteriorates across counties; places with higher levels of unemployment may be
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likely to experience protests regardless of the share of votes going to right wing parties.
Subfigure C (from Model 8) shows that as one moves across the range of the percent of
foreigners in the county, the coefficient for unemployment increases. In substantive terms,
this means that the effect of unemployment is lower when there is a small foreign population,
but higher in counties with large foreign populations.
I also estimated models using interaction terms that included my education variable.
Subfigures D and E (from Models 9 and 10, respectively) show very little change, and the
confidence intervals are too large for meaningful interpretation. However, Subfigure F (Model
11) presents perhaps the most interesting finding. As one moves along the range of education
from lowest to highest, the coefficient of unemployment becomes larger. This means that
in counties where the population is relatively better educated, the effect of unemployment
is larger than in places with lower levels of education. This provides some support for the
idea that the effects of education on tolerance are undermined by relatively worse economic
circumstances.
It is possible that the causal chain leads in the other direction; protests may in-
crease the visibility and spread the message of right wing parties such that they get elected
to office in the next cycle. However, the timing of elections in Germany makes this an un-
likely scenario. While the elections I have coded in my dataset span from 2011-2016, the
overwhelming majority of elections in each state took place in March to May of 2014. This
is before the refugee crisis got underway in the summer and fall of 2014, and before protest
activity flared up. Furthermore, the newcomer in the political arena that experienced the
largest increases in vote share this year was the AfD. At the time of elections, the AfD was
still a neoliberal party that was focused on Germanys role in the Eurozone debt crisis. It
was only afterwards, in early 2015, when Bernd Lucke left the party (and Frauke Petry, the
current leader, took office) as a result of its increasingly xenophobic positions and rhetoric.
My results as they stand support my theory that it is parties that fostered protest
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activity. Having seats in office at a very local level implies a level of organizational capacity
for the party. The takeover of the AfD by the right wing has meant that at a local level,
it has been able to shift its energies and resources and retool the organization to capitalize
on the anti-immigrant political moment. This has allowed it to use its resources to organize
protests. While PEGIDA has also organized protests in some of the same places as the AfD,
they are likely drawing on the same population. Since the AfDs shift, it is also possible that
the same protest leaders are involved in both organizations.
Figure 9: Hotspot Clustering Analysis
I have done preliminary spatial analysis of the protest wave in Germany. Unsurpris-
ingly, my data are spatially autocorrelated, meaning that protests in one county is correlated
with what is going on next door. I found this by both testing for both adjacent and adja-
cent and corners in ArcMap. In future work, I will take this into account in my statistical
analyses. Figure 9 shows the results of a Hotspot Analysis which takes into account spatial
autocorrelation. It merely demonstrates that the protest counts have been clustered in areas
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around Berlin and in a belt from the Czech/Polish border through Thuringa. Interestingly,
there is no cluster around the (much smaller) protests that have occurred along the Baltic
Coast and NPD bastions in Schwerin and Rostock.
This paper tests the spatial distribution of protests in Germany in 2015 that are
the result of the migration of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria and the Lev-
ant to Western European countries. I test several economic and social variables that have
been theorized in previous work to be related to protest activity and anti-immigrant sen-
timent. I use statistics at the county level to measure the process of deindustrialization
and economic restructuring that has left parts of the former industrial West and socialist
East economically depressed. This economic challenge may lead people to fear the arrival
of refugees that theoretically, but probably not directly, will further challenge their tenuous
position in society. Furthermore, these economically backwards areas in the East are those
with the fewest number of Auslnder, meaning they have little experience with other groups.
This means they are perhaps more insular and carry less cosmopolitan identities. This is in
spite of higher than average levels of education in the former east, challenging theories that
education brings about cultural and ideational changes that reduce a feeling of threat.
But protests do not simply arise from grievances and perceptions of threat; there
must be organizations at the local level that are able to organize people and convince them
protesting is worthwhile. In this case, the AfDs platform changed after it was elected to
office, and it is likely that its organizational resources were in some places retooled to organize
protests. In future work, I intend to examine the process of mobilization at the local level to
determine if my quantitative analyses bear out in reality. I want to examine how and why
local party officials decided to organize protests, and what the relationship on the ground
is between the AfD and PEGIDA in places in which they are both active. These protests
heightened the visibility of the party and drew attention to its cause. The AfD stands to gain
politically from these protests; they are an increasingly viable party and have the potential
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to change the national discussion about immigration and force other parties and Chancellor
Merkel to rethink their positions in light of upcoming national elections.
30
REFERENCES
Andrews, K. T. (1997). “The impacts of social movements on the political process:
The civil rights movement and black electoral politics in Mississippi.” American Sociological
Review, 800-819.
Andrews, K. T. (2001). “Social movements and policy implementation: The Mis-
sissippi civil rights movement and the war on poverty, 1965 to 1971.” American Sociological
Review, 71-95.
Andrews, K. T., and Seguin, C. (2015). “Group Threat and Policy Change:
The Spatial Dynamics of Prohibition Politics, 189019191.” American Journal of Sociology,
121(2), 475-510.
Andrews, Kenneth and Michael Biggs. 2006. “The dynamics of protest diffusion:
Movement organizations, social networks and news media in the 1960 sit-ins.” American
Sociological Review 5:752-777.
Arzheimer, K., & Carter, E. (2006). “Political opportunity structures and right-
wing extremist party success.” European Journal of Political Research, 45(3), 419-443.
Belanger, S., & Pinard, M. (1991). “Ethnic movements and the competition model:
some missing links.” American Sociological Review, 446-457.
Biggs, Michael and Steven Knauss. 2012. “Explaining Membership in the British
National Party: A Multilevel Analysis of Contact and Threat.” European Sociological Review
28: 633-646.
Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants (No. w2248).
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Braun, Robert and Ruud Koopmans. 2010. “The Diffusion of Ethnic Violence in
Germany: The Role of Social Similarity.” European Sociological Review 26: 111-123.
Braun, Robert and Ruud Koopmans. 2013. “Watch the Crowd: Bystander Re-
sponses, Trickle-Down Politics, and Xenophobic Mobilization.” Comparative Political Stud-
ies 20: 1-28.
Daphi, Priska, et al. 2015. “Protestforschung am Limit: Eine Soziologische Annae-
herung an Pegida.” WZB.
Elias, A., Szcsik, E., & Zuber, C. I. (2015). “Position, selective emphasis and
framing How parties deal with a second dimension in competition.” Party Politics, 21(6),
839-850.
Espenshade, T. J., & Calhoun, C. A. (1993). “An analysis of public opinion toward
undocumented immigration.” Population Research and Policy Review, 12(3), 189-224.
31
Esses, V. M., Wagner, U., Wolf, C., Preiser, M., & Wilbur, C. J. (2006). “Percep-
tions of national identity and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in Canada and
Germany.” International journal of intercultural relations, 30(6), 653-669.
FAZ. 2013. “Schon so viele Angriffe wie 2014.” Published July 23, 2015. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/zahl-
der-attacken-auf-asylbewerberheime-gestiegen-13716760.html
Gaikwad, Nikhar and Gareth Nellis. 2016. “The Majority-Minority Divide in
Attitudes Towards Immigration: Evidence from Mumbai.” Forthcoming, American Journal
of Political Science.
Geiges, Lars et al. 2015. PEGIDA: Die schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft?
Transcript Verlag.
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media and the Politics
of Antipoverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2006). “Learning to love globalization: Education
and individual attitudes toward international trade.” International Organization, 469-498.
Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2007). “Educated preferences: Explaining atti-
tudes toward immigration in Europe.” International Organization, 61(02), 399-442.
Hainmueller, J., & Hiscox, M. J. (2010). “Attitudes toward highly skilled and
low-skilled immigration: Evidence from a survey experiment.” American Political Science
Review, 104(01), 61-84.
Hainmueller, Jens et al. 2015. “Do concerns about labor market competition
shape attitudes towards immigration? New evidence.” Journal of International Economics
97: 193-207.
Helbing, M. and H. Kriesi. 2014. “Why Citizens Prefer High- Over Low-Skilled
Immigrants. Labor Market Competition, Welfare State, and Deservingness.” European
Sociological Review.
Higgins, Andrew. 2015. “German Village of 102 Braces for 750 Asylum Seekers.”
New York Times, 31 October 2015.
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. “Does identity or economic rationality drive
public opinion on European integration?.” Political Science and Politics 37.03 (2004): 415-
420.
Karapin, Roger. 1999. The Politics of Immigration Control in Britain and Ger-
many. Comparative Politics 423-444.
Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981). Sociotropic politics: the American case.British
Journal of Political Science, 11(02), 129-161.
32
Kitschelt, Herbet. 1993. “Social Movements, political Parties, and Democratic
Theory.” The Annals of the American Academy 528.
Klandermans, P. G. (2014). “Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity
processes and the dynamics of protest.” Political Psychology, 35(1), 1-22.
Koopmans, R. (1996). “Explaining the rise of racist and extreme right violence
in Western Europe: Grievances or opportunities?.” European Journal of Political Research,
30(2), 185-216.
Koopmans, R., & Statham, P. (1999). “Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nation-
hood and the Diferetial Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy.” How social
movements matter, 10, 225.
Koopmans, Ruud and Susan Olzak. 2004. “Discursive Opportunitiees and the
Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany.” AJS 110: 198-230.
Koopmans, Ruud. 1993. “The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965
to 1989.” ASR 58: 637-658.
Koopmans, Ruud. 1997. “Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German
Extreme Right in the 1990s.” Mobilization 2: 149-164.
Kurthen, H. (1995). “Germany at the crossroads: national identity and the chal-
lenges of immigration.” International Migration Review, 914-938.
Kurzman, C. (1996). “Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in social-
movement theory: the Iranian revolution of 1979.” American Sociological Review, 153-170.
Luedtke, Adam. 2005. “European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration
Policy.” European Union Politics 6: 83-112.
Maguire, D. (1995). “Opposition movements and opposition parties: equal partners
or dependent relations in the struggle for power and reform?.” The Politics of Social Protest,
199-228.
Manow, P. and E. Seils. 2000. “Adjusting Badly: The German Welfare State,
Structural Change, and the Open Economy.” In F.W. Scharpf and VA Schmidt, Eds. Welfare
and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford UP.
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2003). Dynamics of contention. Social
Movement Studies, 2(1), 99-102.
Oesch, D. (2008). “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties
in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland.”
International Political Science Review, 29(3), 349-373.
33
Olzak, S., Shanahan, S., & McEneaney, E. H. (1996). “Poverty, segregation, and
race riots: 1960 to 1993.” American Sociological Review, 590-613.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). “Intergroup contact theory.” Annual review of psychol-
ogy,49(1), 65-85.
Rupp, Leila and Verta Taylor. 1990. Survival in the Doldrums. Columbus, OH:
Ohio State University Press.
Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. “Labor market competition and
individual preferences over immigration policy.” Review of Economics and Statistics 83:
133-145.
Schildkraut, Deborah. 2005. Press One for English: Language Policy, Public Opin-
ion and American Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
Schlueter, E., & Scheepers, P. (2010). “The relationship between outgroup size
and anti-outgroup attitudes: A theoretical synthesis and empirical test of group threat-and
intergroup contact theory.” Social Science Research, 39(2), 285-295.
Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). “European opinion about immigration: The role of
identities, interests and information.” British Journal of Political Science,37(03), 477-504.
Staggenborg, S. (1988). “The consequences of professionalization and formalization
in the pro-choice movement.” American Sociological Review, 585-605.
“25000 protestieren in Dresden gegen Ueberfremdung.” 2015. Sueddeutsche Zeitung,
12 January.
Tarrow, S., & Tollefson, J. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collec-
tive action and politics (pp. 41-61). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, Sidney. 2006. Power in Movement: collective action, social movements
and politics Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Thelen, Kathleen. 2013. Varieties of Liberalization and the new politics of social
solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Viterna, J. (2013). Women in war: The micro-processes of mobilization in El
Salvador. Oxford University Press
34
